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JURISDICTION 
Appellee, Staker Paving and Construction Company (hereinafter "Staker"), agrees 
with the jurisdictional statement of Appellant, Flora Sue Macintosh (hereinafter 
"Macintosh"). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly grant Staker's Motion for Summary Judgment where 
Macintosh offered no evidence regarding the standard of care Staker was held to as a 
highway contractor regarding notifying motorists that a section of a road was closed to 
traffic and where Macintosh failed to dispute Staker5 s facts which established that it 
complied with standards established by state regulations? "A district court's decision to 
grant summary judgment is reviewed for correctness with no deference afforded to the 
district court. Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, f 13, 179 P.3d 760. The 
issue was preserved below by Staker's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 32.) 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES 
The following rule's interpretation is of importance to this appeal: 
UT Admin. Code R920-3-1 (through 8/10/2007). 
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Part VI, Standards 
and Guides for Traffic Controls for Street and Highway 
Construction, Maintenance, Utility, and Incident Management 
Operations, 1988 Edition, Revision 3, September 3, 1993 of the 
Federal Highway Administration is adopted by reference. 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by Macintosh when she drove into 
a mound of dirt that had been placed on a closed section of SR-36 while it was under 
construction. Macintosh brought suit against Staker for negligence alleging that it failed 
to adequately warn motorists that this section of road was closed to traffic. (R. 3.) 
Macintosh served no written discovery requests, took no depositions and designated no 
expert witnesses. Staker moved for summary judgment after the conclusion of discovery 
on the grounds that Macintosh had no evidence to establish the standard of care Staker 
owed to motorists or that Staker had breached the standard of care. (R. 31-32.) Staker 
pointed out that it was required by state regulation to comply with the Manual of Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices, Part VI, Standards and Guides for Traffic Controls for Street 
and Highway Construction Maintenance, Utility, and Incident Management Operations, 
1988 Edition, Revision 3, September 3, 1993 (the "Manual"). UTAH CODE ANN. §72-6-
115; UT Admin. Code R920-3 (through 8/10/2007). (R. 53-54.) Staker argued that 
appropriate traffic control for a major road improvement project where some lanes are 
closed while others are re-channeled and diverted is not a topic that falls within the 
knowledge of the typical juror. (R. 54.) In order to establish a prima facie case 
Macintosh needed to offer expert testimony to determine the standard of care and 
whether Staker met the standard of care. (R. 54.) 
Macintosh did not dispute Staker's statement of facts. Instead she responded by 
citing portions of her own deposition asserting that she did not see a sign indicating that 
the lane of traffic that she was driving on at the time of her accident was closed. (R. 62-
63.) She argued that expert testimony was unnecessary because it is within the common 
understanding of lay jurors that a total failure to warn the public against entering a closed 
portion of the road is a breach of the standard of care Staker owed to the motoring public. 
(R. 61-62.) 
In its reply Staker pointed out that Macintosh's assertion that there was a total 
failure to warn the public that a portion of the road was closed is contrary to the evidence 
in this case, including Macintosh's own testimony. Staker cited portions of Macintosh's 
deposition transcript where she testified that she did in fact see traffic control barrels and 
other traffic control devices. (R. 74-75.) The accident report prepared by the highway 
patrol also verified that there were traffic control devices blocking the closed portion of 
the road. (R. 74.) This case does not involve Staker completely failing to warn 
motorists that a portion of the road was closed; rather the issue is whether the traffic 
control that Staker implemented during construction to temporarily close certain lanes of 
travel and divert motorists into other lanes met the standard of care that Staker was held 
to as a highway contractor. Staker argued that Macintosh was required to offer expert 
testimony to establish the standard of care and whether the traffic control, which she 
admitted was in place, breached the standard of care. (R. 78.) 
The trial court granted summary judgment to Staker without a hearing. (R. 88.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were either assumed to be true in the court below or were 
uncontroverted in the record: 
In the summer and fall of 2005, the Utah Department of Transportation contracted 
with Staker to expand and improve State Road 36 in Tooele County. This is the main 
road connecting Tooele to 1-80. Prior to this improvement project most of SR-36 was an 
undivided, two lane road running north and south. Staker improved this road to make it a 
four lane highway with two lanes running each way. (R. 59-60.) 
During construction traffic lanes were shifted so that one side of the road was used 
for traffic with one lane open in each direction while the other side was under 
construction. At 6:00 p.m. on September 9, 2005, Macintosh drove south through the 
construction zone in broad daylight. She observed the shifted lanes of traffic, including 
the lane that she drove through. Macintosh turned west from SR-36 onto Village 
Boulevard. (R. 59.) 
Three hours later Macintosh reversed her course to drive home. She drove east on 
Village Boulevard to its intersection with SR-36. At this time it was dark and there was 
little traffic. After waiting at the intersection for several minutes for the traffic light to 
change, Macintosh pulled into the intersection and attempted to make a left turn onto 
northbound SR-36 Somehow she became confused. Rather than turning into the lane 
for northbound traffic, Macintosh somehow drove between the traffic control barrels 
which closed off the east side of SR-36 to traffic. She proceeded on the closed section of 
vii 
SR-36 until she drove into a mound of dirt that had been placed in the closed section of 
road. (R. 59.) 
Fred Lupo was responsible for traffic control for Staker for the SR-36 highway 
project. (R. 58.) Mr. Lupo received training in traffic control through the Associated 
General Contractors and Utah Department of Transportation and has been certified in 
traffic control since 2000 with recertification every 2-3 years thereafter. (R. 58.) At the 
end of the work day on September 9, 2005 (a short time before the accident), Mr. Lupo 
inspected the traffic control for the SR-36 highway project and confirmed that it 
complied with the requirements set out in the Manual. (R. 57-58.) Following the 
accident, on the morning of September 10, 2005, Mr. Lupo again inspected the traffic 
control for the SR-36 highway project with representatives from the Utah Department of 
Transportation and again confirmed that it complied with the requirements set out in the 
Manual. (R. 57.) 
The only witnesses identified in Macintosh's Initial disclosures are Macintosh 
herself, Dr. Meic Schmidt (Macintosh's treating physician), and "the individuals 
identified in the Defendants' Initial Disclosures." (R. 57, 77-78, 86.) None of the 
individuals identified in Staker's Initial Disclosures were deposed. (Id.) Macintosh did 
not supplement her initial disclosures. (Id.) Macintosh did not designate expert 
witnesses or provided expert reports. (Id.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Summary judgment was appropriate because Macintosh failed to offer evidence to 
establish the standard of care a highway construction company has to notify motorists of 
lane closures. Staker offered unrefuted evidence that it inspected the traffic control on 
the project shortly before and after the accident and confirmed that its traffic control 
complied with the standards established in the Manual. Macintosh was required to offer 
expert testimony to describe the standard of care that Staker was required to comply with 
when it closed a portion of the road and she failed to do so. Finally, undisputed evidence, 
including Macintosh's own testimony, establish that traffic control devices were present 
where she entered the closed section of road so Macintosh has the burden of proving that 
these devices did not meet the standard of care. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MACINTOSH FAILED TO CARRY HER BURDEN OF PROVING A PRIMA 
FACIE NEGLIGENCE CASE BECAUSE SHE DID NOT OFFER EVIDENCE 
REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE OWED BY STAKER TO WARN 
MOTORISTS OF CLOSED SECTIONS OF THE ROAD. 
Macintosh brought this case claiming that Staker was negligent in the way that it 
warned motorists that a portion of road was closed. "To prevail on a negligence claim, a 
plaintiff must establish four essential elements: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries 
or damages." Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah* 2003 UT App. 438, ^ 12. 
Macintosh was required to present evidence of every one of these elements to avoid 
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summary judgment. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co.. Inc., 812 P.2d 458, 462 (Utah App.1991) 
(citations omitted) ("The plaintiff bears the burden of proof and must establish a prima 
facie case to survive summary disposal of the case."). 
Macintosh had the burden of proving that Staker owed her a duty and the scope of 
that duty. Joseph v. McCann, 2006 UT App 459 % 4, 147 P.3d 547 ("Under Utah law, to 
maintain a claim for negligence, a plaintiff is required to establish that a defendant owes a 
duty of care to the plaintiff."). In this case Staker had a duty to meet the standard of care 
for highway construction contractor implementing traffic control on a construction 
project, including warning motorists when a section of road is closed to traffic. 
Summerill v. Shipley. 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995) ("In a negligence case, such 
as the one before us, the standard of care defines the scope of the duty owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff") (emphasis added). Macintosh failed to offer evidence of the 
standard of care that Staker had a duty to meet or the scope of that duty. Without 
establishing the scope of the duty Staker owed her, Macintosh was unable to prove that 
Staker breached the duty it owed her or make a prima facie case that Staker was 
negligent. Summary judgment should be upheld on that basis alone. 
EL MACINTOSH FAILED TO REFUTE EVIDENCE THAT STAKER COMPLIED 
WITH REGULATIONS WHICH SET TRAFFIC CONTROL STANDARDS. 
Staker was required by regulation to establish and maintain traffic control for the 
construction project in compliance with the Manual. UTAH CODE ANN. §72-6-115; UT 
Admin. Code R920-3-1 (through 8/10/2007). No other evidence of the standard of care 
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was presented to the trial court. The trial court was charged with responsibility for 
determining the duty which Staker owed to Macintosh. Duty was a question of law, not a 
question of fact. C.T. v. Martinez, 845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992) ("Whether a duty 
exists is a question of law to be determined by the court."). While the trial court's ruling 
does not explicitly say so, it appears that the trial court found that the Manual described 
the duty Staker owed to motorists to control traffic and warn of lane closures on road 
construction projects. (R. 85-86.) 
In Staker's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment it 
offered a statement of undisputed material facts that were supported by evidence as 
required by Rule 7(c)(3)(A). (R. 57-58.) These facts established that Staker had an 
employee on the construction project at issue, Mr. Lupo, who was responsible for traffic 
control. Traffic control included notifying motorists of construction, that traffic lanes 
were diverted, and lanes or portions of the road were closed. Staker's statement of 
undisputed material facts established that Mr. Lupo was trained and certified in traffic 
control and was knowledgeable about the standards included in the Manual. At the end 
of the work day on September 9, 2005, Mr. Lupo inspected the traffic control for the 
project and verified that it complied with the standards set out in the Manual. The 
following morning Mr. Lupo inspected the traffic control for the project again, this time 
with representatives of the Utah Department of Transportation. This second inspection 
confirmed that Staker's traffic control complied with standards in the Manual. (R. 57-
58.) This evidence established that Staker's traffic control for this construction project 
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met the standards in the Manual. The Manual was the only evidence of the standard of 
care that was presented to the Court. 
Macintosh erroneously argues that there is a factual dispute that precludes 
summary judgment. She cites a portion of her deposition where she testified that when 
she pulled into the intersection before turning onto the closed section of road she recalled 
seeing some traffic barrels but did not see any signs, and after she drove past the barrels 
she did not see any markers blocking the road. (Appellant's Brief, 3.) This does not 
create a dispute of fact that must be submitted to the jury. Macintosh's testimony does 
not refute the facts offered by Staker establishing that its employee who was trained and 
certified in traffic control inspected the traffic control for the project before and after the 
accident and confirmed it complied with the standards in the Manual. Macintosh's 
testimony is insufficient to establish the standard of care or a breach of the standard of 
care by Staker. Macintosh's testimony does not create an issue of fact that precludes 
summary judgment. 
Macintosh did not controvert any fact offered by Staker as required by Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A) & (B). (R. 60-63.) The trial court found that Macintosh 
presented no evidence setting forth specific facts to refute the facts asserted by Staker 
which would create a genuine issue for trial. (R. 85-86.) 
Macintosh failed to present evidence that the standard of care owed by Staker was 
different from the standards included in the Manual. Macintosh failed to present 
evidence to dispute the evidence offered by Staker that proved it complied with the 
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standards found in the Manual. The trial court was correct to grant summary judgment in 
favor of Staker and this ruling should be upheld on appeal. 
III. MACINTOSH FAILED TO OFFER EXPERT EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE 
THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR TRAFFIC CONTROL ON HIGHWAY 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. 
Expert testimony is not required in every negligence case. However, it is 
necessary to determine the applicable standard of care in a particular trade or profession 
and whether the defendant met that standard. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, 
Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah App. 1997), citing Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 
71 lP.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). 
Macintosh was required to submit expert testimony to establish the standard of 
care for highway construction contractors, particularly if she claimed the standard of care 
was different than the standards described in the Manual. The standard of care for 
highway construction contractors performing temporary traffic control for a major road 
improvement project where lanes were closed and traffic was diverted is not a topic that 
falls within the knowledge of the typical juror. The Manual containing the standards 
adopted by the state of Utah for traffic control devices is several hundred pages long. 
Contrary to what many jurors might think, traffic control is far more technical than 
placing a few cones or setting up a few signs. This is particularly true under the 
circumstances which existed on the project where Macintosh had her accident. Traffic 
control did not simply involve blocking off an entire road. On the relevant construction 
project one side of the road was left open. Traffic traveling in both directions was 
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diverted and channeled into narrowed lanes on that side of the road while the other side 
of the road was closed for construction. Expert testimony is required because the 
ordinary lay juror does not have knowledge of the standard of care for highway 
contractors implementing traffic control under these circumstances. A jury should not be 
left to its own devices to guess the standard of care that Staker should be held to and 
decide whether Staker breached that standard or not. Macintosh was required to offer 
expert opinion testimony to establish the standard of care and describe if and how Staker 
allegedly breached the standard. Macintosh failed to do so. Summary judgment in favor 
of Staker was warranted and should be upheld. 
IV. MACINTOSH'S DEPOSITION ESTABLISHES THAT SHE WAS AWARE OF 
LANE CHANGES AND SHE SAW BARRICADES BLOCKING THE CLOSED 
LANE PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT. 
Macintosh claims that she did not need expert witness testimony, alleging: "A jury 
is fully capable of determining if the complete failure to mark a road as closed is 
negligent conduct." (Appellant's Brief, 4.) However, Macintosh's own testimony 
contradicts her allegation that there was a complete failure by Staker to mark a portion of 
the road closed and proves that even she observed barricades blocking and marking the 
closed off portion of the road. 
Macintosh testified that when she turned from Village Boulevard onto SR-6 she 
did not see any sign saying "keep right" (traffic in that direction was actually being 
diverted to the left). (R. 74-75.) However, in her Memorandum Macintosh conceded that 
when she turned onto SR-36 "she saw barrels on the road." (R. 62.) She testified that the 
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traffic control barrels in the road which spaced about three or three and a half feet apart. 
(R. 69, 74.) Significantly, Macintosh also testified that several hours before the accident 
she drove through the same section of SR-36 and noticed the traffic barrels in the road 
that separated the closed off lanes of traffic. (R. 65-68, 74.) 
In addition to Macintosh's testimony, the highway patrol officer who investigated 
the accident reported that it occurred in a closed portion of the road. His report notes the 
traffic control barrels between the open and closed portions of the road. (R. 48, 74.) 
Macintosh's testimony confirmed that there were traffic control devices in the 
road. These devices were markers used to close portions of the road and alert motorists 
that portions of the road were closed. Macintosh's claim that there was a "complete 
failure to mark the road as closed" is unsupported and contrary to the evidence. 
(Appellant's Brief, 4.) Therefore the issue is not, as Macintosh argues, whether a 
complete lack of traffic control devices closing a portion of the road fell below the 
standard of care. Rather, the issue is whether Staker's traffic control that was present at 
the time of Mackintosh's accident closing off a portion of the road met the standard of 
care that Staker owed to motorists. Macintosh failed to offer evidence that it did not. 
Macintosh testified that she was confused by the traffic control barrels and other 
devices marking the lane diversions and closing lanes to traffic but she did see them and 
confirmed that markers were present. Macintosh's testimony that she was confused by 
the traffic control markers closing the road and was somehow able to get past them and 
on to the closed section of road is not evidence that Staker was negligent. "[Tjhe mere 
happening of the accident to plaintiff is no proof of negligence on the part of either 
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plaintiff or defendant or evidence of the same." Vitale v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 
365 (Utah App. 1996) quoting Williams v. Ogden Union Rv. & Depot 119 Utah 529, 
545, 230 P.2d 315, 323 (1951). 
Staker's statement of undisputed material facts, which Macintosh did not dispute, 
established that the traffic control that was in place at the time of the accident complied 
with the standards in the Manual. Macintosh failed to offer expert testimony establishing 
that the standard of care was different from the standards in the Manual or evidence that 
the traffic control that was in place which she observed fell below the standard of care. 
The trial court's ruling granting Staker's Motion for Summary Judgment was therefore 
correct and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellee respectfully requests that the court affirm 
the district court's order granting summary judgment. 
DATED this 24th day of December, 2008. 
CHRLSTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Minute Entry 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA SUE MACINTOSH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No.: 060300169 
Judge: MARK S. KOURIS 
The above matter is before the Court on Defendant's Notice to Submit its Motion for 
Material Facts, rather Plaintiff writes, "She [Plaintiff] indicated that she saw barrels on the road 
which were not blocking the lane of traffic into which she turned, and there was no sign 
indicating that the road was closed." (PL's Opp., 2) (citation omitted). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals explained, "Although it is true that summary 
judgment is reserved for only the most clear-cut negligence cases, oare contentions, unsupported 
by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will 
picclude entry of s;ummary judgment." Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quotation omitted); see also FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 
594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979) ("Issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to 
be resolved by the fact-finder. It is only when the facts are undisputed and where but one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law"). 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Defendant is to prepare an Order for the Court's signature. 
Dated this _ day of A?ML^- 2008. 
BY THE COURT-
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MARK S. KOU 
DISTRICT COU 
00084 
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